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Abstract
Decision taking can be performed as a service to other parties and it is
amenable to outtasking rather than to outsourcing. Outtasking decision
taking is compatible with selfsourcing of decision making activities carried
out in preparation of decision taking. Decision taking as a service (DTaaS)
is viewed as an instance of so-called decision casting. Preconditions for
service casting are examined, and compliance of decision taking with these
preconditions is confirmed. Potential advantages and disadvantages of
using decision taking as a service are considered.
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1 Introduction
This paper has been written with the objective to state and answer the question
to what extent it is possible and meaningful to use and to offer decision taking
(DT) as a service, hereafter abbreviated as DTaaS.
For the definition of decision taking that I will use, I refer to [6]. That
definition is unusual in the to the extent that a decision is an action rather than
a result of an action.
1.1 Service casting and service casting preconditions
DTaaS will be understood as a substitution instance of the context [-]aaS where
DT is placed in the “hole”. Thus DTaaS abbreviates [DT]aaS. For an activity
or entity or process X, XaaS (= [X]aaS) is what I will call the service casting of
X. [X]aaS is defined only if X satisfies so-called service casting requirements.
In particular DTaaS represents the service casting of DT, provided that DT
satisfies the service casting requirements, that is a collection of constraints that
any X must comply with for [X]aaS to make sense, that is to be well-defined.
These constraints are called service casting preconditions. The objective of this
paper is twofold: (i) to determine a reasonable account of the service casting pre-
conditions in general, and (ii) to find out why and to what extent DT complies
with these service casting preconditions.
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1.2 Parametrized roles
S abbreviates service and [-]aaS stands for the service casting operator X →
[X]aaS. S can be considered a role and the service casting operator can be
understood as an instance of the so-called generic role casting operator which
takes role Y to the role casting operator [-]aa[Y].1
Below I will make use of the role casting operator [-]aa[F] where F stands for
feature. XaaF views X (or instances of X) as a feature of entities or processes
that incorporate some form of X.
In principle role casting preconditions indicate for which roles Y, [-]aa[Y] is a
valid role casting operator. I will avoid this level of generality and I will assume
that “service” satisfies suitable role casting preconditions without making an
attempt yo analyze these in detail.
1.3 Decisions and units
In [32] the observation is made that decision making research mainly stands on
two feet: description and prescription; a similar dichotomy underlies the survey
[33]. The same may hold for work on decision taking. I will avoid both de-
scription and prescription, and instead focus on the structure of decision taking
as behavioral processes for agents and for groups of agents. I will understand
decision making and decision taking as structural mechanisms for multi-agent
cooperation independently of existing practice. Decision taking constitutes an
organizational control mechanism.
Following [11, 12] I will speak of units to indicate all forms of organiza-
tional entities. Units may be equipped with a hierarchical structure includingg
subunits at various levels. Sourcements (see [10]) are descriptions of sourcing re-
lations between units. Outsourcing and outtasking are examples of sourcement
transformations.
Decision making (DM) can be split in two parts: decision preparation (DP)
and decision taking. In symbols: “DM = DP + DT”. Because DT is usually
connected with leading roles and a unit will not function without leaders, it is
implausible that DT is outsourced together with the sources (leaders) responsi-
ble for it.
Some authors (e.g. see [43]) read decision taking as the reception of a decision
outcome in the role of staff responsible for realizing the goals of the decision
taker. Although this is a coherent interpretation of decision taking I will deviate
from it. I will not use or propose a special term for the action or process of taking
notice and subsequent comprehension of a decision outcome. Other authors,
e.g. in [38] use decision taking as an equivalent of decision making, a use of the
terminology that I am not following either.
In [3] decision making and decision taking are distinguished in a way that
comes close to the interpretation of [6] by accepting the real time character and
the situational dependency of decision taking, in contrast with decision making,
but without assuming the convention that a decision is an action. Below I
1[-]aaS = (let Y = S in)[-]aa[Y].
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will make use of so-called outtasking of decision taking. Admittedly this is an
uncommon phrase; it is related to delegation of decisions as found in [37] and
in [23].
In [42] the outsourcing of self-governent is analyzed as a philosophical theme.
The analysis leads the author to formulating doubts concerning the mentioned
notion. These doubts are grounded in both the human nature of the outsourc-
ing agent and in the comprehensiveness of the range of decisions supposed to be
outsourced. In the terminology that I prefer to use, outtasking would be prefer-
able to outsourcing for the use made of in in [42], because the human agent,
viewed as a unit, cannot possibly export any of its internal sources (given today’s
biotechnology at least) to an external unit.
1.4 Organization of the paper
DT is contrasted with voting and promise issuing in Section 2, then in Section
3 DT is viewed as a feature of organizational behavior. A comparison with
computer program structuring is made, and it is described how an organization
may proceed if it makes no use, or limited use, of the DT feature. In Section
4 the concept of service casting, that is casting an entity class or an activity
class (concept) as a service, is examined in rigorous detail. Several examples
of service casting are considered and service casting preconditions as well as
service casting obstacles are collected.
In Section 5 the particular case of service casting DT is approached by
indicating how DT complies with the service casting preconditions and avoids a
match with the service casting obstacles. In Section 5.3 possible rationales for
making use of DTaaS are surveyed and a preliminary risk analysis for DTaaS is
provided. In Section 6 the intended audience for a theory of DTaaS is specified
and the intended yield for those in the intended audience of acquiring familiarity
with our theory of DTaaS is formulated. Finally in Section 6 some conclusions
and directions for further work are mentioned.
2 Voting, choosing, promising, and guessing
For the purpose of this paper the boundaries of decision must be laid down
with more precision than has been done in [6]. In [6] the distinction between
decision and choice has been discussed extensively, with the effect that (i) an
act of choice need not be a decision and, (ii) that a decision need not involve
choice.
When contemplating DT free activity it matters to what extent choice, vot-
ing, and promising are considered to overlap decision.
2.1 Formalizing aspects of ontology
With X ⊆ Y (X is a subclass of Y) I will mean that every instance of X is an
instance of Y. X-Y denotes the class of instances of X that are not instances of
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Y. When considering classes of actions c(X), the complement of X is ACT - X.
With ACT denoting the class of actions and with CH denoting the class of
choices (acts of choosing from a menu of alternatives) it follows that DT ⊆ ACT,
CH ⊆ ACT, while DT and CH are not disjoint and neither one is a subclass of
the other. But I maintain that most decisions are not choices.
If by default (but not necessarily always) instances of X are also instances
of Y that relation between X and Y is denoted as X ⊆d Y. It follows that X ⊆
Y implies X ⊆d Y. In particular we find DT ⊆d c(CH) and CH ⊆d c(DT).
Individual voting (IV) as well as group voting (GV) are subclasses of choice,
thus: IV ⊆ CH, GV ⊆ CH, IV ⊆d c(DT), and GV ⊆d c(DT).
Social choice (SC) is an aggregate of which IV’s are a part (component)
rather than an instance, and SC ⊆ CH. Concurrent IV’s are collected in a
group vote (GV) which itself is embedded (used as a phase in) social choice.
Now GV ⊆d CH, and SC ⊆d CH.
Promise issuing (PI) is a class of actions disjoint from DT, so PI ⊆ c(DT).
Moreover PI ⊆d c(CH), that is, most most acts of issuing a promise are not
choices. Obligation creating promise issuings (OCPI) are a proper subclass of
PI, so OCPI ⊂ PI.
For a class of actions X service casting of its instances ([X]aaS) is considered
plausible if for most instances of X it is conceivable in technical terms that these
are provided as a service. I will consider [X]aaS implausible if it is not the case
that [X]aaS is plausible. Now I will use the (defeasible) rule that if X ⊆d Y &
pl([Y]aaS) ⇒ pl([X]aaS).
As an example: let DT4I denote DT for investment issues and DT4F de-
note DT for financial matters. Then DT4I ⊆d DT4F, and if one assumes
pl([DT4F]aaS) it follows that pl([DT4I]aaS) as well.
Guessing may be considered a subclass of choosing: G ⊂ CH. Making a
Random guess (RG) is a subclass of guessing. Indeed, guessing cannot constitute
a decision, but of course it may constitute the mechanism by which a choice is
made on which a decision is bases. I assume that pl([G]aaS) because providing
an unbiased guess is not easy and may require a form of independence that can
be provided by a specialized agent to a consumer of guesses. Moreover, RG may
require specialized technology and thereofer pl([RG]aaS) can also be justified.
2.2 Voting, social choice, and decision
However, between choice and decision there is voting, as well as social choice.
Related to decision is promising (promise issuing). I hold that voting, social
choice, and promising by default (that is in most cases) do not constitute de-
cisions. Clearly understanding the difference between promising, voting, social
choice, and decision is necessary because neither voting, or social choice, nor
promising can be cast as a service.
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2.3 Voting and social choice
In order to distinguish voting from decision taking I will make the following
assumptions about voting:
1. Casting a vote (by an individual voter) is an act of voting.
2. Each act of voting is an instance of choice.
3. The result of casting a vote (by an individual voter) is an individual voting
outcome (IVO).2
4. Individual voters act concurrently,3 while together performing a group
voting process.
5. A group voting process terminates and subsequently the plurality of col-
lected IVO’s can be aggregated to a single AVO (aggregate voting out-
come) by means of some aggregation method.4
The design, analysis, and selection of aggregation methods for votings
belongs to the area of social choice theory. There exists a large volume of
theory on voting and social choice for instance [35, 44], most of it not in
need of notions like IVO and AVO. An AVO is frequently referred to as a
decision, thus reflecting a point of view that I do not share.
6. The AVO is merely the outcome of the overall voting process, and it must
be distinguished from the consequences of putting it into effect.
7. Depending on the particular organization of the group of potential voters
as well as depending on its objectives, casting a vote may range from being
an instance of making a choice to being an instance of taking a decision,
with in between acts of voting that constitute a class of their own. Here
are two extremes:
• If the voting outcomes cannot be traced back to individual voters
(anonymity), and if the voter cannot predict the impact of his/her
particular choice made when voting, the IVO will not have the form
2An IVO is often referred to as a vote but that terminology is confusing as a vote may also
refer to an act of voting, which I prefer as its meaning. It may even refer to the fact that an
agent has the right to vote. The common use of the term vote seems to vary between static
and dynamic interpretations. This process product ambiguity is quite common and may often
lead to confusion. As an example of process product ambiguity I mention the notion test in
software engineering (see [30]).
3This form of concurrency can be adequately formalized with arbitrary interleaving based
parallelism, for instance using the process algebras specified in [4].
4Making an aggregate social choice (and thus producing an AVO) as implemented by means
of voting is in most cases not an instance of decision taking as understood in [6] because the
aggregate agent has no intentions which it is aiming for and because it makes no predictions
about the consequences of putting the AVO into effect. Social choice, is not an instance of
choice and social choice is not necessarily an instance of decision either. By default it is not.
In fact, In many political systems social choice is a more powerful mechanism than decision
taking.
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of impact the voter expects from a decision outcome, and for that
reason its coming about will not count as a decision.
• If the following conditions are satisfied:
– the vote is open,
– if the voter can reasonably predict the impact of its own contri-
bution to the aggregate outcome,
– the voter has a clear mind about the impact that putting the
AVO into effect is likely to have,
– its by “publication” of the AVO that its putting into effect is
triggered, not simply by the participants in the voting feeling
permitted to go their own way,
– the entire voting group acts on the basis of a clear role, and
– each member is acting in terms of that role.
then,
– the voting may be considered a group decision with the AVO
constituting the corresponding decision outcome, and
– the IVO may be considered a decision outcome (in fact it is
only a constituent of a decision outcome) and the preceding act
of voting may be considered a decision taken by the individual
agent.
The degree to which these considerations are consistent with the
assumptions IV ⊆d c(DT), and GV ⊆d c(DT) that were formulated
in Paragraph 2.1 above depends on one’s attitude towards voting’s
in general.
8. If a group votes on which direction to proceed in a dangerous area that
voting is a matter of choice or of action determination but not of decision
taking. If a group vote is used by one or more members for the justification
of their own subsequent activity than referring to the voting as an instance
of decision taking goes against the idea of OODT.
9. In some cases a decision outcome needs to be confirmed (ratified) after-
wards by some body with higher authority. Then the action producing
that “decision outcome” still counts as a decision if it was taken with
the expectation that ratification will succeed. This leads to the following
pipeline:
• A process involving different levels and stages of decision taking and
social choice leads to the listing of persons that may be elected in
office.
• Social choice mechanisms, often based on voting, are used to select
who will be in office for some period.
• Persons in office enact decision taking, for that task they may be
supported by non-elected staff for decision making (decision prepa-
ration).
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• Decisions must be ratified afterwards by means of small scale so-
cial choice (normally involving non-anonymous voting), performed
by bodies of agents who have been put in place for limited periods of
time by social choice mechanisms implemented by way of anonymous
voting.
• The primary responsibility for the (consequences of effectuating the
outcome of the) decision remain with the agent who took the decision,
who is by default assumed to expect ratification.
10. Confidential boardroom voting with individual voting outcomes open to
all participants may be in some cases be considered an instance of decision
taking, whereas the voting that takes place with national elections in so-
called democracies does not. Indeed I will assume that a small group
of persons constituting a board, which is engaged in open and personal
discussions, can have intentions in spite of possible differences of opinion,
whereas a large group of individuals cannot be attributed an intention on
the basis of the interpretation of an AVO that came out of a group voting
process in which these individuals had been invited to participate.5
One may contemplate voting as a service (VaaS). In some cases it is ad-
missible that an individual outtasks a voting assignment to another agent. It
is implausible, however, that an agent specializes in voting on behalf of other
agents on a systematic scale. For this reason I consider VaaS to be an implausi-
ble notion. Precisely this observation necessitates making a distinction between
voting and deciding in preparation of contemplating DTaaS.
2.4 Promise issuing
Promising, that is, issuing a promise, is an action comparable to but yet different
from taking a decision. This matter needs to be analyzed at this point because
it impacts on the plausibility of DTaaS. For the notion of a promise I refer to
[18, 19, 7, 8]. As discussed in [6] there is a connection between promise and
decision. This connection would be simpler and more symmetric if a promise
were understood as an act of promising. Because that convention would deviate
too much from common usage I will not primarily understand a promise as an act
of promising but rather as its outcome. A promise is the tangible or intangible
outcome of an act of promising and promise issuing (PI) is performing the act
of promising.
There is remarkable complementarity between promise issuing and voting.
Both voting and promise issuing produce an outcome from which further con-
sequences may result. Voting involves choice, but it need not be the expression
of an intention or of an expectation. Promise issuing involves intentions and
expectations but it need not involve choice.
5The social choice processes supposed to be supported by the forms of reasoning as sug-
gested in [5] may also count as decision taking in my opinion.
8
I will distinguish promise issuing from promise making, with promise issuing
referring to the action, and promise making referring to a more comprehensive
process of which promise issuing constitutes the concluding phase. Promise
making may include preparatory steps, mainly for designing the form and the
content of the promise (also called promise body in [7]).
Promise issuing is close to decision taking but it differs in important ways. I
suggest the following relation: every decision outcome is a promise but not the
other way around.6 Promise is more general than decision outcome because: (i)
the promiser (comparable to the decision taker) need not have any expectations
concerning the consequences of effectuation of the promise, (ii) the promise may
be intangible (like a mathematical entity, which stands for a shared cognition)
while a decision outcome must be tangible, (iii) the role of a promiser is imma-
terial, (iv) if a promise has an intangible form, for instance two or more agents
remembering that something was said, then the consequences of the promise
are mediated via the different components of the promise (that is the cognitive
residues of the act of promising as they exist in different agents that were in
scope of the promise, including the promiser) and not via the single “promise”
(viewed as an outcome of promise taking), (v) the scope of a decision outcome
is merely its readership as prescribed by the decision taking protocol at hand,
whereas the scope of a promise (see [7]) is more immediately determined by the
act of promising involved.
The reason to consider promise issuing in some detail arises from the follow-
ing observation: “promise issuing as a service (PIaaS)” is a problematic (that
is, not necessarily plausible) concept because (i) it is unclear how promise is-
suing can be delegated to another agent, (ii) it is unclear what it might mean
to be more capable of promising on behalf of a promiser than the promiser is
him/herself.7 I conclude that although DT is a subcategory of PI, for PI in
general PIaaS is a problematic notion. At the same time I intend to maintain
that DTaaS is a coherent (potentially plausible) concept.
So it must be the case that especially for cases of PI that do not qualify as
DT provision as a service is implausible. A criterion that separates promises
for which PIaaS is implausible from decisions is the concurrent creation of obli-
gations for the promiser. Some promises create obligations for the promiser.8
Obligation creating promise issuing is not an instance of decision taking. It
appears that “obligation creating promise issuing as a service (OCPIaaS)” is
an implausible notion. That implausibility renders PIaaS problematic, but not
6The viewpoint that each decision is an instance of promise issuing derives from the formal
definition of a promise in [7]. For different definitions of promise issuing the relation with
decision may work out differently.
7“Marketing as a service (MaaS)” is a plausible notion, and some forms of MaaS might
be viewed as an instance of PIaaS. The difficulty with understanding PIaaS is immediately
connected to the difficulty of explaining the precise role of promises. The abundance of
promises “in the real world” seems not to be based on the existence of a definite semantics of
the term promise but rather on its absence.
8According to [18, 19, 7] promise issuing need not involve the creation of an obligation
for the promiser. In particular promise issuing by automated agents must be viewed as
autonomous action.
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DTaaS.
3 DT as an (organizational) feature (DTaaF)
Besides interpreting decision as an act rather than as an outcome I will consider
it to be a feature of organizational structure, amenable for analysis in terms
organizational design and architecture, rather than as an aspect of human be-
havior primarily amenable to empirical investigation. DTaaF is a perspective on
DT which allows to assess from an external perspective which activities count
as DT and which do not. DTaaF also allows the view that an organization may
be transformed as to feature more (or less) DT, that is to have more (or less)
frequent occurrences of activity classified as DT.
Decision taking is a concept that emerges from attempts to modularize the
behavior of existing or imagined organizations, rather than a concept which
emerges when considering the behavior of single individuals or the collective be-
havior of groups of individuals.9 I will follow [6] with the following assumptions:
1. A decision is an act of decision taking with actor (agent), time and place
as required coordinates.
2. A decision must produce a decision outcome which is a tangible item for
instance a text.
3. The effectuation of a decision outcome leads to the consequences of that
decision outcome. These consequences may be referred to as the decision
effect. Whereas the decision outcome is in existence immediately after
and as a direct consequence of the decision, the decision effect may be
unpredictable, its identification may be controversial and its coming about
may take much time.
4. Every decision is taken by an agent with the intention that effectuation of
the resulting decision outcome has the expected consequences; it depends
on the role of the decision taker who needs to take care of effectuating the
decision outcome.
5. If agent a takes a decision that is action is performed in the context of a
playing some specific role, without that role being known or specified a’s
production of a decision outcome amounts to no more than a mere speech
act,
9In psychological research it seems to be taken for granted that many forms of behavior,
including most forms of human choice, may be considered instances of decision making, which
is usually not distinguished from decision taking. I disagree with that usage of the language to
the extent that in my view when making a choice is observed no decision taking is necessarily
implied. Choice takes place whenever an agent acts in a setting where the agent was aware of
alternative actions that it might have performed instead in full compliance with operational
constraints of the setting. An animal may also perform choices even if it is harder to determine
the meaning of awareness in that case. That an animal is able to take decisions is implausible
according to [6].
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6. Rather than the choice between different options, the production of an
intermediate product (the decision outcome) is the primary feature of a
decision.10
7. In the absence of a decision outcome, the effectuation of which brings
about the intended consequences (as expected by the decision taker), mak-
ing a choice between different behavioral options amounts to a choice and
a choice may be made in the absence of a decision.
8. The most obvious alternative to a decision is not to take that decision
(not to take another decision).
9. Decision taking is a concluding subprocess of decision making, decision
making primarily involves the preparation of decision outcomes. Decision
making is embedded in a larger decision making process which also involves
protocol actions that do not influence decision outcomes.
10. A decision terminates an episode of indecision.
11. A decision is an action but it need not be a decisive action, while a decisive
action need not be or involve a decision. A decision is a decisive action
only if in hindsight it appears that effectuation of the decision outcome
had decisive consequences.
12. Making up one’s mind in preparation of an action is not an instance of
decision taking.
13. A command (also called an imposition in [8]) is the outcome of an act of
commanding (command issuing) and it is like a decision but it indicates in
addition which agent has to act. If the command is tangible it comprises
a decision, but if it is intangible the command may be a speech act or
a gesture in which case it will usually fail to count as a decision. Thus:
command issuing that leads to a tangible command (outcome oriented
command issuing) produces a decision at the same time, whereas on the
fly command issuing produces an intangible command only which does
not count as a decision.
In addition to what was stated in [6] it is required that a decision outcome is
largely self-explanatory. A mere bit (0 or 1, usually termed “yes” or “no”) is
insufficient in the absence of an unambiguous reference to a rendering of the
question to which that bit is supposed to constitute an answer.11
10Typically a car driver makes choices which do not qualify as decisions when handling the
controls of the car while in motion. However, the step to install a car kit for a mobile phone, or
the step to buy a new map or a (new) navigation device, may or may not be the consequence
of a decision. For instance if a form is created and signed to instruct a car dealer to install a
new car kit, that form may be understood as a decision outcome of the car owner’s decision
to acquire a new car device. But if besides buying food, fuel, and newspaper, a map is bought
because of its fresh look and feel, the latter action may not count as having been done as an
effectuation of a decision outcome.
11When voting an agent may choose “yes” (or “no”) unaware of its implications or meaning.
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3.1 Remote method invocation as an analogue
My perspective on decision taking is derived from a perspective on activity found
in the area of computer programming. When observing a machine effectuating
an instruction sequence one sees no more than a sequence of steps. That the
instruction sequence has been written in a so-called structured notation is a
matter of conceptual organization at a higher level of abstraction.
For instance it might be stated that a certain sequence of steps is best gener-
ated by effectuating a method call from an appropriate class thus providing the
additional judgement that methods and classes are useful means of structuring
in the case at hand. Seen from the perspective of an effectuating machine it may
be preferable that a particular method is performed by another machine, which
comes close to it being outtasked to that (other) machine, thus leading to so-
called remote method invocation, or in terms of our topic: method effectuation
as a service (MEaaS).
Rather than viewing decisions as very particular actions taken by agents
or by organizations, decision may be seen as a way to structure organizational
behavior. For instance it may be “decided” (at the level of organizational design)
that a particular class of actions must always to be preceded by decisions so
that the effectuation of an action from that class can be understood as the
effectuation of a decision outcome to that end. That is useful only if a protocol
for decision taking, as well as for the preparatory part of decision making is laid
down as well.
From this perspective it is plausible that if an organization U plans to make
use of DTaaS it may need a preparatory phase for structuring its operations in
such a way that DT takes a more prominent place to begin with. In particular
DT may then take place as a thread amongst other threads in a multi-thread run
by way of strategic interleaving by some managing body.12 The transition to-
wards DTaaS where some external agent s provides a similar thread as a service
to U ’s management body may be understood as temporary thread migration.
DT as provided by an internal service must be monitored internally from
the perspective of DT demand management. Only if it is known what non-
DT threads expect from a DT thread it can be agreed what to expect from an
external provider of a DT thread.
3.2 Decision-low operation as an organizational feature
By outtasking DT to other organizations (and using DTaaS) an organization
may become “decision-low”, that its its operation is rather independent of its
In our understanding of the act of voting a vote may be cast by an agent without having any
intentions in mind.
12Changing an organization into a mode of operation where decision taking is more promi-
nent has virtues outside the context of DTaaS. Achieving such transformations may be valu-
able if increased accountability and transparency are sought. Of course the converse holds
as well: turning decisions into mere choices may be helpful if accountability, traceability, or
transparency are to be diminished.
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own internal DT activities. Considering organization X its low-decision feature
may come about in various ways:
• not yet having developed a tradition of internal DT,
• abandoning roles from which DT is plausible,
• abandoning business processes and tasks that require DT,
• outtasking DT,
• adapting processes tasks in such a way that choice and action determina-
tion replaces decision taking.
Below in 5.3 I will outline possible advantages of decision low-ness for an orga-
nization.
4 On services and service casting
A service is defined as an identifiable and intangible activity that is the main
object of a transaction in [40] (see also [21]). I will use a somewhat more detailed
definition of a service, useful in particular to separate services from products,
that was used in [31]. In [31] the distinction between products and services is
clarified by means of an extensive quote from [45]. In brief a service is sold
by one party to another, but as opposed to product, it is intangible (as an
entity), heterogeneous (as a concept), it is perishable (non-enduring), and it is
necessarily consumed and produced concurrently. According to [31], however,
services may carry products along and products may carry services along, the
difference being a matter of gradation rather than a very sharp one. One may
perhaps simplify these requirements to the condition that a service is a process
which can be provided against compensation by a third party.
4.1 Casting activities and products as a service, a cata-
logue of examples
In [24] “music as a service (MaaS)” is explained to be the transfer of music in
digital form, by way of streaming without transferral of ownership of the data.
MaaS is seen as an instance of content as a service (CaaS). Now if one listens
to ordinary live music the suggestion that ownership is transferred has never
been present, and that suggests that live music has always been music as a
service. However, in order to grasp the phrase “music as a service” one needs to
understand that live music is not meant with that phrase as it would be odd to
look for a new name for such a classical phenomenon. For that reason the phrase
MaaS lives in another world, most plausibly the digital world, where music as a a
product is known, and music as a service may be a novel phenomenon. More can
be said, however: the provider of live music cannot concurrently serve different
customers with different tunes, whereas a digital service provider is supposed
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to be able to serve different clients at the same time in ways more flexible than
mere broadcasting. This concurrency criterion on service provision is absent in
the discussion of [31] but it seems to be a helpful addition to understanding
what is amenable to service provision and what is not.
In [34] business dashboards as a service are discussed. As far as I can see the
authors fail to explain the plausibility of service casting in this case. Instead
they merely analyze the virtues of dashboards (implemented as an interactive
tool for business data visualization) for management purposes as well as the
need for further research about them. The phrase “dashboards as a service”
suggests the presence of a third party collecting a client’s business information
and extracting from that a clever abstraction which is provided to the client in
the form of a dashboard, which itself is an internet service. This is a plausible
explanation of what “dashboards as a service” might amount to, irrespective of
the extent to which that constitutes a realistic IT market opportunity at this
moment in time. In the discussion of [31] from which we have already quoted
criteria for the distinction between product and service, the presence of a third
party arises from their condition that a service can be sold by one party to
another.
In [27] the usage of “(security) policy as a service” is explained in the context
of cloud security. This is a convincing example of service casting. A security
policy is intangible and non-product like but its real time provision by a third
party (and hosted in the cloud) may be understood as a novel feature.
In [36] one finds an elaborate description of (software) “composition as a
service” (abbreviated as CaaS in [36] but here as SCaaS in order to avoid con-
fusion with “content as a service”). SCaaS is presented as a phenomenon in the
context of software as a service (SaaS). SCaaS differs from SC by its provision
by a third party which justifies service casting in this case. Software composi-
tion satisfies all requirements in the entities traded as services as formulated in
[31].
In [17] a description of cloud computing is given with a focus on “infrastruc-
ture as a service” (IaaS). IaaS is considered the most generic service provided
by a cloud in addition to PaaS (platform as a service, see also [28]) which is
committed to some fixed brand of systems software, and SaaS (software as a
service) which in addition implies a commitment to an application area and a
family of software products applicable to that area from which services may
be composed automatically on demand. The phrase IaaS is difficult to grasp
because infrastructure primarily refers to a product rather than to a process.
It seems to be more precise to speak of “infrastructure behavior as a service”
(IBaaS) instead.
In [1] flexibility as a service (FaaS) is proposed. Although flexibility is no
more than an attribute of a service offering, this instance of service casting is
based upon the fact that principles of service composition can be provided in
such a way that flexibility results. Remarkably, “services as a service” (SVaaS)
becomes meaningful if it implies a focus on service construction by means of
systematic composition in real time at the provider side. As [1] points out,
FaaS is an objective which can be obtained through what I just termed the
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SVaaS perspective.
Software as service is currently the most well-known instance of service cast-
ing, by which all other instances seem to have been inspired.13 I will now discuss
this example of service casting in some detail.
Finally an interesting case is “politics as a service (POLaaS)”.14 POLaaS
(often written PaaS, which unfortunately collides with “platform as a service”)
has a formidable presence on the internet.
4.1.1 SaaS, SEffaaS, SEaaS, STaaS, and SPaaS
In spite of software constituting a product (tangible good) rather than a process
(intangible good), SaaS (software as a service, see [41]) is at present the most
prominent instance of service casting.
Because software is effectuated when used, “software effectuation as a ser-
vice” (SEffaaS) makes perfect sense, (with AHaaS for “application hosting as a
service” as the more common name). SaaS goes beyond SEffaaS however, as it
also comprises the on demand and real time composition of services (as provided
by software being effectuated), and it may include the provision of software from
a remote server. SEffaaS and SEaaS ([Software Engineering]aaS) are both in-
cluded in SPaaS (software process as a service), which goes beyond SEffaaS
and SEaaS (by taking all phases of the software life-cycle into account. SPaaS
also comprises the service area STaaS (software testing as a service, also known
as TaaS) and SDaaS (software development as as service). Another option is
PRSaaS for providing software as a service. T
4.1.2 (Provision of software) as a service =
provision of (software as a service)?
The background of all service casting expressions XaaS might, if only as a
thought experiment, be understood as follows: (i) XaaS is a service, (ii) every
service H is identified with providing H, (which is abbreviated to PR H). Thus:
XaaS = PR (XaaS), (iii) associativity of bracketing is used PR (XaaS) = (PR
X)aaS. In the case of software:
Software as a service = providing (software as a service) = (providing soft-
ware) as a service.
Identification of a service casting with its provision may be considered im-
precise, and that leads to contemplating inverse-provision as a kind of inverse
13If software is identified with “families of polyadic instruction sequences”, an identification
which I consider to be adequate, it becomes reasonable to understand software as a mathe-
matical entity, which is intangible rather than tangible. Of course the physical representations
of mathematical objects are tangible, but the mathematical objects themselves are not, or not
necessarily. Thus I will identify computer software with “(conventional) physical representa-
tions of families of polyadic instruction sequences”, thereby rendering software tangible.
14The late Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn made headlines in the Netherlands with his slogan
“at your service”, which may be understood as his intention to provide POLaaS to the Dutch
public. The extent to which POLaaS is a credible option that escapes from the problems
of plain power oriented populism still puzzles Dutch political commentators ten years after
Fortuyn’s violent death in 2002.
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operator for service casting. If inverse-provision denotes the abstraction from
the phenomenon of the provision of a service to the abstraction consisting of its
underlying service then one obtains the equation:
XaaS = inverse-provision ((provision of X) as a service).
This explanation of service casting would imply that it renders every service
casting plausible, which is itself an implausible state of affairs, and for that
reason I will not take it seriously.
4.2 Plausibility of service casting
I will use concept as a category that includes, entity, service, process, prod-
uct, and method. For each concept X, the service casting of X, [X]aaS can be
contemplated. Service castings range from implausible to plausible. X satisfies
the so-called service casting preconditions of Paragraph 4.3 below if and only if
[X]aaS is a plausible service casting.
The question arises which cases of service casting are plausible. That ques-
tion is seemingly paradoxical in the following sense: if X is a service then XaaS
makes little sense because [X]aaS suggests that X is seen from the service per-
spective, instead of its “natural” perspective.
4.2.1 Implausible cases of service casting
If X is not nearly a service then it may defeat being viewed from a service per-
spective. Here are some examples. None of the following service castings seems
to make sense: “jogging as a service”, “meaning as a service”, “gold ownership
as a service”, “medication as a service”, “bicycles as a service”, “hardware as a
service”, “sleeping as a service”, “breathing as a service”, “flying as a service”,
“consciousness as a service”, “being born as a service”, “self-confidence as a
service”, and “dining as a service”.
4.2.2 Unclear cases of service casting
There are unclear cases as well. At this moment I have no judgement available
on the plausibility of the following potential service castings: “choice as a ser-
vice”, “social choice as a service”, “owning as a service”, “spying as a service”,
“swimming as a service”, “natural numbers as a service”, “walking as a service”,
or “happiness as a service”.15
4.2.3 Service casting obstacles
Service casting obstacles are preconditions on a concept X that render XaaS
implausible under all circumstances. Two such conditions can be identified at
this stage: X is a service already (a violation of this condition will be labeled as
weak implausibility of the service casting at hand), and non-disposablity, that
15In contrast “well-being as a service” (often referred to as wellness service) is plausible.
16
is after outtasking or outsourcing X from U , an unacceptable loss of identity of
U has occurred.
4.3 Service casting preconditions
The following conditions on X must be met for [X]aaS to be plausible:16
Ontological constraints. Preferably X satisfies the criteria listed in [31] for
services. To meet those criteria X needs to be intangible, and non-
enduring, and P’s production and consumption must be necessarily con-
current. Preferably X is a kind of activity rather than a kind of entity. If
X is tangible the following clause applies.
Service casting preconditions for product classes. If X is product-like (tan-
gible) rather than service-like (and therefore intangible) and if [-]aaS is
instantiated to XaaS, then the following conditions must be met:
1. XaaS will provide processes P that usually represent the usage of X
(or of instances of X),17 and,
2. if a process P representing the usage of X (or of an X) can be provided
through the internet, services as meant by XaaS will be delivered as a
webservice, and several customers may be provided the same service
at the same time.
3. if P is most likely is to be provided via the internet, and if normal
effectuation of the process X does not involve human operation then
XaaS will definitely not involve human operation.18
Significant deviation from normal casting. The concept X is not normally seen
as a service.19 A violation of this precondition amounts to weak implausi-
bility. Weak implausibility does not imply incoherence, it merely implies
service casting is applied in an implausible case. From these considera-
tions it follows that casting activity, or entity, X as a service requires that
the audience for the phrase “X as a service (abbreviated XaaS)” accepts
the following implicit ambiguity:
• X must not a service by default. But the difference between the
default role of X and its role after being cast as a service should not
16Plausibility is a semantic notion purely related to the amenability of X for being offered
as a service, or for suggesting a clear interpretation of [X]aaS which is to be distinguished
from usefulness of [X]aaS, once it has been accepted as a plausible concept, for its consumer
and producer.
17If XB represents the behavior of an X (or of an instance of X) then XaaS is understood
as XBaaS by default.
18In the case of SaaS (software as a service) this constraint explains why SaaS will not extend
to “software engineering as a service” (SENaaS), a “product” involving human engineers that
has been delivered by the software industry for many years.
19I propose to call “online banking as a service” weakly implausible because online banking
is normally considered a service.
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be too large either. If it is too large one arrives at implausible service
castings, some of which have just been listed.
• The more distant XaaS is from the normal role of X the more suc-
cessful the notion XaaS may become. Probably SaaS has acquired
significant popularity just because software is commonly understood
as a product (and not as a service).
self X is the normal (default) case. If X is normally a service it can be placed
in the context self[-] thus obtaining “self[X]”.20 If it is explicitly meant
that X is understood in its default meaning that can be expressed with
“X as usual”.21
Demand management phase is an option. As a preparation for a XaaS phase
for it prospective consumer U may need to structure its own X processes in
such a way that X is performed as self[X] (by U), though in a separate unit
which is monitored and managed with principles of demand management.
Once this managed self[X] process is in place outsourcing or outtasking X
to an appropriate service provider is easier to achieve.
Disposability. It must be the case that stripping X from a unit (that is termi-
nating self[X]) need not necessarily imply a loss of its identity.
Concurrency potential. Implicit in agenta a’s offering a service X to U is that a
can, at least in principle, offer the service X concurrently to a plurality of
clients. This form of concurrency can be described by strategic interleaving
for multi-threading as outlined in [13]. That concurrent offering of X is
an option is a property of X and it can be understood as a service casting
precondition.
Potential for co-creation of the service by provider and consumer. It is some-
times proposed as a key aspect of services that these are co-created by
producer and consumer.
5 DTaaS
After considerable preparations a “formal” (in the sense of “official”) introduc-
tion of DTaaS is now enabled. The introduction splits in four parts: (i) creating
DTaaS as a (meaningful) concept, (ii) a survey of DT specific aspects of DTaaS
instances, (iii) a survey of potential advantages of DTaaS for its consumer and
provider, and (iv) a survey of risks and potential disadvantages for DTaaS.
20For instance self hairdressing.
21For instance: “self hairdressing” is probably cheaper than “hairdressing as usual”, thus
avoiding “hairdressing as a service” which is weakly implausible.
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5.1 DTaaS: a definition
As a concept, DTaaS is the result of service casting applied to the concept DT.
For this result to be well-defined compliance with the various service casting
preconditions needs to be checked. This matter will be addressed in Paragraph
5.1.1 below.
Each instance of DTaaS involves a unit and an agent. DTaaS refers to a
particular kind of sourcement: DTaaS occurs if an agent a provides DT as a
service to a unit U. In the case that a provides DTaaS to U , the decisions taken
by a are taken on behalf of U and have the same status as decisions taken by
U ’s management.
Much can be said about instances of DTaaS which is specific for DT as a
concept. For instance that this sourcement is likely to have arisen by outtasking
a part of U ’s DT to a, where outtasking refers to a temporary transfer of an
activity (task) to another unit (the unit containing a) without a corresponding
transfer of sources. In Paragraph 5.2 a range of further observations concerning
instances of service casting DT, which are specific to DT rather than to service
casting in general, is made.
5.1.1 DT meets service casting preconditions
DT is intangible, and it is not normally cast as a service. Further self DT is
the default situation and demand management for DT is an option, though in
order to understand that option one probably needs an awareness of the notion
of DTaaS already. DT is disposable in some cases and a DTaaS provider may
concurrently provide DT services for different clients. By developing adequate
DT protocols, a DP task which may be shared with the client, co-creation of
DT services between provider and consumer may be achieved.
5.1.2 DTaaS avoids service casting obstacles
DT is not usually considered a service, and outtasking DT, in whole or in part,
need not necessarily degrade a unit’s identity. In ?? a listing has been made of
the activities that differ from DT and that will remain after outtasking DT.
5.2 DTaaS: DT specific aspects
The purpose of this section is to specify the result of service casting of DT, and
more specifically of DTI (leading to DTIaaS) for some decision interface I, in
greater detail than merely stating that it results from service casting.
5.2.1 Which decisions can be delegated?
Which decisions can be delegated to a service provider? Because it is hardly
conceivable to hand over “all DT” to an external agent, there is no way around
some form of modularization. To that end one may take advantage of the
concept of a decision interface (DI), which collects a coherent family of issues or
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topics about which decisions may be taken. Elements of a decision interface are
sometimes called decision rights, but that is asymmetric as these elements may
equally well be understood as decision obligations (or more neutral, decision
tasks, decision options, or decision patterns). The notion of a decision interface
is symmetric. It is understood that an agent having regular DT as its task
may collect all of its potential decisions in an overall DI which is modularized
(decomposed) as a combination of disjoint sub DI’s.
Given a decision interface I, DTI represents DT concerning decisions in I,
DMI stands for DM concerning decisions in I and DPI concerns DP limited to
decisions in I. We have the following I-specialized equation “DMI = DPI +
DTI .”
In [6] it has been argued that DT requires that the the DT agent operates
in a clearly determined role. Thus some role must be provided, at the least this
role is the following “external DT agent on behalf of U”, or “external DTaaS
provider for U”, or simply “external decision taker for U”. The role name is
likely to be linked to the decision interface for which the role has been sought.
It is an existing practice that external DTaaS is sought for brief episodes
and dedicated to a single issue or to a very confined range of issues, the role of
an external DTaaS provider has more intrinsic names, for instance a jury, if a
prize is to be awarded on behalf of U ,
it is worth mentioning some further examples of role names for thematic
episode driven instances of DTaaS (abbreviated as EdDTaaS) with limited
scope: (i) a mediator if mediation is sought for a conflict between subunits
within U (and DTaaS is applied because mU may not be considered sufficiently
impartial, or may not have the required authority or trust base within U), (ii)
a court if U has sought the intervention of a legal process, (iii) some specialized
authority (e.g. the EFSA, European Food Safety Authority) which is asked to
intervene, (iv) an active private banker who may trade on behalf of its clients,
(v) a mountaineering guide is in charge of a well understood part of his/her
client’s DT during a trip, (vi) an auctioneer decides about transactions between
parties who have each agreed to stay within the protocol prescribed by the
auctioneer.
5.2.2 What sourcing options exist for DT?
Having stated that an instance of DTaaS is a sourcement of a particular kind,
it is useful to consider in some detail which sourcements may allow an external
agent a to perform DT (or DTI) on behalf of the management mU of some unit
U? Here are some observations concerning that matter.
• Unit management may be self-sourcing for DT, that is mU performs DT
(in other words it applies self DT). This is most common and I will assume
that it is the case by default.
• DT may have been delegated by mU to one or more subunits at a lower
level in U ’s management hierarchy. In this case U is self-sourcing for DT
but mU is not.
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• U may sometimes distinguish between governance (gU ) and management
(mU ), in which case it is the role of gU to delegate DT to management
functions within U .
• if gU temporarily delegates DP to an interim manager imU instead of
to mU , U is still self-sourcing for DT because imU operates under the
responsibility of gU .
• U may be temporarily non self-sourcing for DT. That means that DT has
been temporarily delegated (outtasked) by gU to an agent a operating
outside U . In this case a acts as a service provider for mU . The authority
and steady support of gU is required to assure that a is in a decision taking
role rather than merely in a consulting role where it may at best suggest
potential decision outcomes to mU .
As long as gU keeps the outtasking relationship between U and a in place
mU accepts the decision outcomes of a decisions as if these were decision
outcomes brought about by its own decision taking. It is essential to
specify in advance which types of decisions constitute part of the DTaaS
agreement, because mU cannot undo a’s decisions any easier than its own
decisions.
5.2.3 Which sourcement transformations exist for DT?
In [12] the notion of a sourcement transformation has been examined in detail,
with a particular focus on the following transformations: outsourcing, insourc-
ing, backsourcing, and follow-up outsourcing. Without further analysis I will
postulate that corresponding transformations can be found if only tasks but no
sources are being transferred: outtasking, intasking, backtasking and follow-up
outtasking. For the case of DTaaS the outtasking transformation is of particular
importance.
• DT cannot be outsourced. This is so because outsourcing of DT (from
a state where it is performed by mU ) involves moving mU (or a part of
it) outside of U , which cannot be done unless the characteristic feature
of its being the management of U is lost. An artificial option which I
will discard as being unconvincing is to give members of mU part-time
positions in an insourcing unit U ′ outside U .
Another artificial opting that is mentioned only is that given the decision
interface I, the bodymU is decomposed asmU = m
d,I
U ∪m
nd,I
U into disjoint
groups md,IU (involved in decision taking about decision patterns in I) and
m
nd,I
U (not involved in decision taking concerning decision patterns in I),
and to assume that mnd,IU is outsourced by U to a. This option is artificial
because it casts doubts on the status of mU as a managing body in the
original situation.
• outtasking of DT is possible, a consequence that being that the tasks of
mU are temporarily reduced.
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• Task externalization is not an option for DT. Indeed it is against the
required autonomy of U as being an independent unit if DT is transferred
to an external agent on an indefinite basis. Thus the feature of outtasking
that it comprises a temporary transfer of tasks is essential in the case of
transferral of DT.
• If DT has been outtasked to agent a, that agent is called an external
decision taker on behalf of U .
• Because DT cannot be outsourced and DT is a part of DM, only partial
outsourcing of DM is possible. In particular only partial or full outsourcing
of PM is possible.
• Typically DP or parts of it can be outtasked to a so-called consultant.
• By definition DT cannot be outtasked to a consultant (in its role as a
consultant).
5.3 Possible reasons for engaging in DTaaS
DTaaS is a (potentially) meaningful concept in the sense that it may open a
novel perspective on organizational architecture. DTaaS seems to be uncommon
except in cases where quite dedicated DT processes are outtasked and often in
a case by case fashion only.
DTaaS will be initiated by the outtasking unit U , or rather by its governing
body (subunit) gU which will make use of the DT services of agent a which may
be a part of unit U ′ instead of having that part of DT self-sourced for U by mU .
For enacting this outtasking transformation gU needs plausible reasons. These
reasons will differ from case to case but some general remarks concerning these
reasons can be collected:
• DT provider a may be less vulnerable to the effects of stress created by
an involvement in DT concerning U than mU . Even a’s authority or trust
base may exceed that of mU .
• DT provider a’s awareness of the consequences of possible decisions to
parties outside U may exceed that of U .
• DT provider a may include highly skilled DT specialists who are especially
competent in: (i) timing of DT, (ii) prediction of the effects of implement-
ing potential decision outcomes, either tactically or strategically, or both,
(iii) managing the core of DP preceding DT, (iv) evaluating the quality
of preparatory DP activities may exceed that of mU , (v) drafting decision
outcomes, (vi) communicating decision outcomes.
• DT provider a may be able to apply process models to DT which it has
used elsewhere and by doing so perform at a higher level of competence
compared to the competence level provided by the DT function within
U . For instance a may be well placed to deal with (that is to guarantee)
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abstraction (preventing information from leaking to third parties) and
encapsulation (preventing external interference) for the decision process.22
• Every decision may be understood as the effectuation of a decision taking
thread, itself the result of putting into effect an underlying instruction
sequence (e.g. see [15]). Effectuating such instruction sequences23 may be
a particular competence of a.
• As argued in [6] DT may involve multi-threading (see [13]) in the case
of DT for U . As a may be providing DTaaS services for several different
clients simultaneously a may be dealing with hierarchical multi-threading
(see [14]). More efficient methods for strategic interleaving of hierarchical
decision threads may be available to a than to mU .
• By outtasking DT mU arrives at a situation where it can concentrate on
putting decision outcomes into effect. In that case mU may operate in
an almost decision free fashion. Once decision outcome effectuation has
become standard practice mU may terminate outtasking DT or part of it.
• For U it may be helpful to forget about short term tactical DT in order
to fully concentrate on long term strategic matters. The opposite may
hold as well: then mU makes use of DTaaS provided by a hoping that a is
able to deal with long term and strategic matters while mU is capable of
operating with full concentration on tactical and sort term issues of vital
importance to u’s existence.
• DTaaS can be used to reduce the burocracy in the outtasking organization.
Burocratic simplification can conceivably be achieved by training staff to
perform a significant amount of action without the need for DT processes,
thus reducing the volume of DT and outtasking a part of the remaining
DT may further reduce the dependency on DT. Once DT is out of the
way business process optimization and automaton can both be used to
streamline an organization’s workflow.
• DT provider a shares the responsibility of (the effectuation of the decision
outcomes of) its decisions with the unit U to which the service is provided.
The legitimacy of a having these responsibilities has several sides, but a
sufficient criterion is that gU , which is in charge of ultimate responsibilities
for U , can argue convincingly that it is in U ’s best interest to outtask DT
to a. In particular if an emergency of a particular kind has to be dealt
with, a’s competences to deal with the variety of issues connected with
that particular kind of emergency may be valued of higher importance
than conformity of a’s own intentions with achieving some or all of U ’s
strategic objectives.
22Abstraction and encapsulation are notions from process theory ([4]) which find an appli-
cation in many decision making process.
23In particular these instruction sequences may involve conditions written in the notation
of short-circuit logic, which is semantically analyzed by proposition algebra (see [16]).
23
5.4 DTaaS risk analysis
DTaaS is a thought experiment rather than common practice. DTaaS for short
episodes or limited to relatively confined decision classes is common practice,
but DTaaS for the full width of mU decision rights seems to be unusual. Never-
theless, even as a thought experiment DTaaS is amenable to risk analysis. There
is a plethora of potential risks that DTaaS carries with it for its consumer. I
will mention only a few aspects of the risk analysis.
• There may be a risk of vendor lock in when U makes use of DTaaS provided
by a If DP is outsourced to a there is a risk that U may not be able
to realize backsourcing of its DM activities, thus becoming dependent of
a. This may be a reason for not outsourcing DP to the same service
provider as the one to which DT is being outtasked. It even suggests
that outsourcing DP brings with it a higher risk of vendor lock in than
outtasking DT may do. If only DT has been outtasked to a, U must make
sure, and communicate that backtasking DT from a is an option at regular
instances of time.
• Like in the case of an external consultant U ’s appreciation of a’s services
may degrade. In that case a’s staff may withdraw from its involvement
in a DTaaS sourcement if its authority has become problematic and its
activity is less effective.
• That creates the risk that an occurrence of DTaaS is taken to be a sign
that mU fails to live up to its expectations. In fact mU seems to carry an
obligation to take the majority of its own decisions itself. DTaaS is about
the thought experiment that this obligation is replaced by a less restrictive
policy towards the range of task descriptions suitable for a management
agent or team mU .
• Assuming that a provides DTaaS to different units a conflict of interest
arises if at the same time a needs to strive for opposite objectives.24 Be-
cause a is taking decisions it does so with the awareness of expected con-
sequences (of effectuation of decision outcomes) and with the (delegated)
intention to effect these consequences. That intentions can be delegated
at all is open for discussion, and I will assume that when acting as a DT
provider for U , a may pretend intentions (on behalf of a) that are not
quite its own, provided that these intentions comply with a’s best and
own intention to maintain a bundle of pretended intentions on behalf of
U that best serves U ’s interests, and to do so in a consistent fashion.
24Less apparent than an outright conflict of interest is so-called feature interaction (see
[26]). If a is involved in providing DT services for different units it needs to analyze feature
interaction between its respective decision interfaces. A conflict of intentions is an obvious
instance of feature interaction, but more subtle interactions may need attention as well.
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper contains a theory of DTaaS and following [11] it is fitting to ask
about the intended audience of that theory and to ask what members of that
intended audience might get out of it. In the terminology of [11] the latter
question is phrased as to what ability or which conjectural ability is supposed
to result from an acquaintance with this theory. These conjectural abilities
are twofold: the ability to acquire a DT task and to start acting as a DTaaS
provider (intasking DT, the transition complementary to outtasking DT), and
the ability to outtask part of one’s DT activities in order to concentrate on
other activities which are considered to be of higher importance in some stage.
Returning to the matter what constitutes an intended audience for this paper:
those potential readers who take an interest in decision taking and have accepted
the preparatory analysis made in [6].
An analysis of service casting has been provided as well as a demarcation
of decision taking separating it from choice, individual voting, social choice,
and obligation creating promise issuing. Using these ingredients the conceptual
coherence (consistency) of DTaaS has been established and potential advantages
of its use have been indicated.
Further work can be descriptive, aiming at finding instances of DTaaS in ex-
istence and investigating how that came about and what advantages are actually
obtained. Another and perhaps more attractive path is to investigate existing
organizations or projects and to find suggestions for first making DTaaF more
visible in the organization (or project) and subsequently outtasking a part of
DT so that DTaaS is made use of.
As an application of this work DTaaS can be introduced in pilot organiza-
tions or projects in order to find out which of the mentioned potential advantages
can be achieved in practice, and if so under what circumstances.
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